Thursday, December 15, 2011

The Evolving United Nations


The Evolving United Nations

    

(Originally this article was published in  Feuilles Universitaires,  Revue publiee par La Ligue des Professeurs de L’Universite Libanaise, No. 6/7 2eme Annee 1994)



     The establishment of the United Nations in the closing months of the Second World War represented an important effort by states to meet the needs for maintaining international peace and security, and to grasp the presented opportunity.  The year 1945 was an appropriate moment for charting a new design for world order.  The Charter of the United Nations emerged from the San Francisco Conference.  It represented a series of compromises among states with diverse interests and varying political, economic and cultural backgrounds.  The founders of the Charter hoped that most of the compromises would endure.  They anticipated, however, that some of the compromises might not last.  This was why many powers and functions of the United Nations were stated in general terms with the expectation that they would be interpreted in the light of future specific situation.  Accordingly, provisions were made in Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter for its amendment and review.

     The founder of the United Nations did not intend the Charter to be a rigid perfect instrument, but rather a “human” instrument that “has within it ample flexibility for growth and development, for dynamic adaptation to changing conditions”.[1]  The Charter was designed to lay a broad base for an institution that might develop to meet changing needs.

     The dramatic changes that occurred immediately after the establishment of the United Nations inspired a doubt as whether this new organization had been endowed with sufficient powers to maintain world peace and security.  The appearance of the atomic bomb was one change that created a new phase for mankind.  The split of the Second World War’s victors into two camps, East and West, was another change that for almost half a century played an essential and dangerous role on the international stage.  These changes have resulted in further changes in the attitudes of nations and peoples.  The United Nations has not been able to live up to its promises and expectations, and to operate as effectively as its founders had hoped.  It has become apparent that changes in the United Nations have been necessary in order to cope with the situations and to adapt the functioning of the Organization in the field of peace and security to constant threat of war.

     Changes have been taken place within the United Nations system.  The Charter has been subjected to changes in a variety of ways.  Certain articles have already fallen into disuse by not being implemented or applied.  Others have been interpreted or applied by various organs and members of the United Nations in ways that the founders of the United Nations did not contemplate.  Special organs and agencies have been created.  Supplementary or supporting treaties and agreements have been concluded.  Equally important, the organs and procedures of the United Nations have undergone an evolutionary growth through the process of trail and error.

     Although changes made to date have affected the provisions of the Charter substantially, they have left its text intact, except with regard to a few articles which were formally amended to meet certain needs.[2]  To some extent this has been due to the difficulties inherent in the amending process, especially to the fact that any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council could veto a proposed amendment.  This reality, however, has not precluded numerous proposals for changes in the United Nations to be introduced.

     The following two sections deal with the changes that have occurred on the international stage since the establishment of the United Nations and their effects on the Organization, and with the methods available for achieving changes in the United Nations which involve informal ones used to date and formal ones provided in the Charter.





I. The United Nations in a Changing World, 1945-2007



     There is nothing similar in the whole history of mankind.  During only six decades significant changes have taken place that have put the fate of man on a crossroads, the crossroads of survival or total destruction.

     Second World War was followed by far-reaching scientific and human revolutions of a global nature.  “The forces of science and technology were unleashed in both negative and positive directions, creating in man both a new sense of insecurity and terror and a renewed hope that a better life is within his reach.”[3]  Atomic energy and other advancement in science, technology and medicine which have been brought to mankind with all of their potential for good and evil have changed the relations of nations and peoples.

     The advancements have influenced persons’ and nations’ attitudes in a many ways.  There have been greater demands for self-determination, for democracy, and for opportunities to improve the economic, educational and social status of individuals, groups and nations.  All these have caused significant events to occur during the last sixty decades since the establishment of the United Nations.  The most important events have been the liquidation of the colonial system, and the rise and fall of the Soviet empire.  These two events have affected the United Nations.  They have led to the expansion in the membership of the United Nations, and to the shift of powers, functions and influence within the United Nations.



A. Liquidation of Colonial System       

     All the 45 percent of mankind that was under the domination of the colonial powers in 1945 achieved independence by 1990.[4] The prolonged and persisting struggles of national liberation movements and the successful anticolonial campaign of the United Nations have brought an end to the hundreds of years of western colonization of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.  The colonial powers, after several wars among themselves, lost their strength and became unable to maintain their empires in the face of the awakened oppressed people of their colonies.

     Since the time of its creation the United Nations has been involved in a global campaign of anticolonialism and decolonization, which reached its peak in 1960 and has maintained its full momentum in succeeding decades.  The United Nations has made a distinctive and effective contribution to overturning of the colonial system.  Its attack upon colonialism has been extensive, as the multitude of words and resolutions on the subject that its different branches have adopted demonstrates.[5]

     The concern of the United Nations with the colonial problem has been varied and extensive.  The 1960 “Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People” marked the culmination of drastic change in the relationship of the United Nations to colonialism.[6]  This declaration adopted by the General Assembly has been an outstanding landmark in the movement against colonialism by making the war against this system a major enterprise of the United Nations.  In later resolutions by the General Assembly, the war on colonialism was pushed several steps ahead.  The legitimacy of colonial struggles for self-determination and independence was recognized and all states were invited to provide material and moral support to national liberation movements, i.e., the members of the United Nations were overtly invited to enlist in armed struggles to overthrow colonial and racially discriminatory regimes.

     The United Nations' campaign against colonialism has been successful.  In 2007, 47 years after the adoption of the declaration on decolonization, all territories formally under colonial rule have become independent.



B. Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire

     In 1945, the victorious Red Army liberated Eastern European Countries from the Nazi occupation. Three years after World War II all these countries had Communist governments. Eastern European Countries became satellite states of the Soviet Union. The consolidation of power in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power led to the polarization of the world.  The world split into two camps, East and West, with conflicting ideologies and concerns.  In May 1955, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European Countries established the Warsaw Pact as alliance for cooperation and defense among them.  This was in response to the creation, in April 1949, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as organized defense cooperation between the United States of America and its Western allies.  The alliance between the United States of America and the Soviet Union during the Second World War was replaced by distrust and competition.  The “Cold War” between the East and the West was embarked.

     By using its military might and intimidation, the Soviet Union was able for four and half decades, following the Second World War, to maintain its control over East Europe, and to influence world events.  It formed friendships with a great number of third world countries, particularly in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

     In maintaining control over East Europe, the Soviet Union and the Communist Governments of these countries resorted to force to crash several revolts, e.g., the Hungarian revolt of 1956, the Czechoslovakian revolts of 1967 and 1977, and the Polish revolts of 1968, 1970 and 1981.  Although, the Soviet Union succeeded in crashing these revolts, it failed to suppress the aspiration of East European peoples for national independence and democracy.

     With the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in 1985, a new kind of leadership was emerged in the Soviet Union.  President Gorbachev was devoted to political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union, and to improve relations with the West.  This meant letting democracy take its course in the Soviet Union and East Europe. Democracy swept all over East Europe. In 1989, first democratic non-communist government took over Poland. In the same year, Hungary got its first non-communist government. On November 8, 1989, the Berlin Wall Collapsed. By the end of 1989, most of Eastern European Countries achieved national independence by peaceful means.

     The Soviet Union, itself, was not immune from the spread of democracy and national independence. In 1990, the three Baltic Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were the first to declare independence and seceded from the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1991, the Russian people defeated the coup d'etat by the hard-line communists who tried to recapture the power and put the Soviet Union back on its past course. By the end of 1991, all the Republics of the former Soviet Union achieved national independence.  The Soviet Union ceased to exist.

     The fall of the Soviet Empire put an end to the Cold War between the East and the West, with most of its consequences. However, this fall resulted in the emergence of new problems. Ethnic wars erupted in several Republics of the former Soviet Union, and in the former Yugoslavia. These wars represent major threats to the international peace and security.

     The above events have caused significant changes in the United Nations. The changes have been reflected in the following two areas: expansion in the membership of the United Nations; and shifting powers, functions and influence within the United Nations.



C. Expansion in the Membership of the United Nations

     The Most profound change, which significantly affected the structure and the patterns of powers and influence in the United Nations, is the increase in the number of members from 51 in 1945 to 191 in 2007.  The majority of the states which got together to lay the foundation for the United Nations were long-established states with developed political, economic and social systems.  They had substantial populations, and were western in their general orientation.[7]  The majority of members in 2007 represent developing states which have not yet achieved stability in their political, economic or social systems.  In addition, these states have various cultural backgrounds.

     The priorities and concerns of the majority in the early years of the United Nations were different from those of the majority in the latter years.  In the early years, the majority took an anticommunist position on the Cold War issues; relatively few states were uncommitted.   In the latter years, the majority took a neutral position concerning the East-West conflict. The problems of decolonization and racial discrimination constituted a priority to this majority since most of the states themselves were former colonies. States were concerned about establishing their national identities, and developing their political, economic and social systems.  At the present time the majority is devoted to cooperating in the field of economic development and world peace and security.   States are concern about their political, economic and social development.

     The expansion in the membership of the United Nations has caused the rise of blocs and groupings of states around common characteristics and interests of all kinds, as well as the emergence of new issues, problems and priorities.  These blocs and groups which roughly approximate political parties have played a significant role in the decision-making process of the United Nations.  The largest of the blocs has been the Group of 77 (or the developing Nations bloc), which has consisted of some 120 member states.  Next largest has been the Non-Aligned Movement, which has consisted of some 90 members. Following has been the 50-member African Group.  Next has been the Islamic Conference, which has consisted of 41 member states.  Also, have been the 39-member Asian Group, the 33-member Latin American Group, the 22-member Western European “and others” Group, the 23-member Arab Group, and the 11 member Eastern European Group­ (ceased in 1990).  In addition, there have been the smaller groups: the 5 Nordics, the 6-member Association of Southeast Asian Countries; and the 10-member European Community.[8]

     It is important to note that although blocs have been extremely important in determining many outcomes in the organs of the United Nations, they have not been invariably decisive.  Many states have been belonging to more than one bloc and have been subjected to various sorts of influences and interests, which have affected their attitudes toward any issue.  Blocs, except to some extent the Eastern European Group before 1989, have not been concrete or cohesive in nature.[9]  However, the tendency of states to get together in the United Nations in voting blocs based on their special interests has placed all the state members of the organization at the mercy of blocs which command sufficient votes to initiate or prevent action of any kind.[10]

     An important result of the expansion of the membership of the United Nations has been the increase in the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council from 6 to 10.  These seats have been allocated as follows: 5 for Africa and Asia, 1 for Eastern Europe, 2 for Latin America, and 2 for Western Europe and “other states”.

     Another aspect of the expansion of the United Nations' membership in the sixties and the seventies was represented by the shift of influence in the General Assembly, from the United States of America and its allies to the Soviet Union.  The Soviet Union, which was in a minority position in the early years, emerged as an influential power in the United Nations.  Before 1989, the Soviet Union was able to make common cause with the emerging majority in the United Nations, the nations of Asia and Africa.  Colonialism, national liberation, self-determination, economic develop­ment and social justice were issues which the Soviet Union not only was able to gain from, but they also gave it an advantage over the Western Camp, the United States of America and its allies.[11]  The Soviet Union, with the new majority in the United Nations, was able during the years 1960 and 1989 to influence the outcomes of the General Assembly, other organs and agencies of the United Nations.  However, as the result of the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991, the United States has been able to recapture the majority in the United Nations, and since then, it has been the most influential state in this international organization.       

  

D. Shifting Powers, Functions and Influence

     The mechanism envisaged in the 1945 United Nations Charter which vested upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security proved during the early years of the life of the Organization its defects.  The Council, because of the veto, failed to meet its responsibilities under chapters VI and VII of the Charter.  The defects in the mechanism have rested on the fact that the permanent members failed to cooperate among themselves, and to make the United Nations system work by equipping and using it as a chosen instrument for achieving common ends.

     The success of the United Nations depends primarily on the cooperation of the permanent members of the Security Council.  At the time the Charter was written, its authors assumed that the major allied victors would find it in their interests to cooperate to make the United Nations effective in order to prevent the recurrence of another world war.[12]  It soon became apparent, however, that the silence of guns after the end of the Second World War put an end to their cooperation.  The Major victors split into two camps with conflicting ideologies, views and concerns regarding the necessary conditions of peace and security, and regarding the role which the United Nations should play.

     In the early years of the United Nations, the Western powers, the US and its allies, sought to make extensive use of the Organization for restoring conditions of peace and security in the war-torn world.  This attitude was dictated by the fact that they were able to control the majority in the Council and the Assembly.  The Soviet Union and its allies, on the other hand, who were a minority in both organs, considered any action by the United Nations as detrimental to their interests, since it would further the interests of the Western powers.  Action which the majority in the Organization sought to undertake were viewed by the Soviet Union as direct threats to its security, and therefore to be prevented by the use of the veto in the Council.  In this line, it looked upon the United Nations more as means to be used to prevent action inimical to its own interests than as means of cooperation for common purposes.[13]

     The characteristics of the Cold War, such as fear, distrust and lack of confidence in the other side, were behind the failure of the United Nations to implement the enforcement provisions of the Charter by the conclusion of Article 43 agreements making available to the Council the forces and facilities necessary to the full discharge of its responsibilities.[14]  This failure was the first major blow to the United Nations system. The experience of the early years which was influenced by the Cold War demonstrated that the veto power exercised by the Soviet Union made the Council an unreliable instrument for providing collective security and maintaining international peace and order.  Responding to this reality, the Western powers sought alternative means for providing collective security.  The first means was the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4, 1949.  The inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 was the basis on which NATO was founded. NATO became the basis for organized defense cooperation among West European powers, United States and Canada, and the principal collective means by which these states faced their major external threat in the years of the Cold War.[15]

     The second means sought by the Western powers to deal with threats to international peace and security was the use of the General Assembly as an alternative to the Security Council, in case the latter was prevented from taking an action because of the veto.  The General Assembly on November 3, 1950, adopted the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution. [16]

     In essence the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution grants the General Assembly the power to act in place of the Security Council only if the Council fails to discharge its primary responsibility.  Under it, the Assembly may do by recommendations anything that the Council can do by decisions under chapter VII.  The Assembly can make appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including the use of armed force, (1) if the Council, because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its responsibility, and (2) in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.  The above two facts represent the essential preconditions to the operation of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution.  By the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, the Assembly in effect asserts its right to act in the same manner that the Council can act under chapter VII of the Charter, but only when the Council fails to act.[17]

     It is obvious from its provisions that the Resolution provides a system quite different from the one the drafters of the United Nations Charter intended.  Instead of “decisions” by the Council which members are obligated to carry out, collective action is to be based upon “recommen­dations” by the Assembly which are not legally binding upon members.[18]  Also, instead of “special agreement’ referred to in article 43 to be the basis for making available to the Council armed forces, the armed forces under the Resolution are to be made available to the Assembly by members on a voluntary basis.

     On the Eastern side, the Warsaw Pact was concluded in May 1955 as an alternative means for collective cooperation and defense for the Soviet Union and its Socialist allies, in response to the creation of NATO and the adoption of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution.

     The Cold War between the East and the West had a negative affect on the United Nations system for maintaining peace and security.  The system weakened and became distorted.  The shift of powers and functions with this regard from the United Nations to NATO and the Warsaw Pact represented a very serious blow to the expectations, which the founders of the international organization hoped to further.  The expectation to establish one world organization for the purpose of taking effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace, and to suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, was demolished.   NATO and the Warsaw Pact were two gigantic systems that function independently of the United Nations.  Their rivalry and mutual fears resulted in arms race, polarization of the world states, a weakened United Nations as an organization of collective security, and the threat of nuclear war.[19]

     The period of “détente”[20] which followed the Cold War in the early seventies was unable to remove the negative impact of the Cold War on the workability and effectiveness of the United Nations.  The world politics during the years of “détente”, as it was during the years of the Cold War, was mainly preoccupied with conflict between super powers, and arm race and competition.  The United States and the Soviet Union continued behaving in the same manner they behaved during the years of the Cold War.  However, a significant change relating to the center of influence in the United Nations occurred.  The influence upon the United Nations which the US and its allies were able to exercise by mobilizing support for their position came to an end.  Between the early sixties and late eighties, such influence had been exercised by the Soviet Union, who was able to mobilize the majority in the Assembly, and even to some extent in the Council, to support its position.  The United States found itself in the same shoes the Soviet Union had found itself in the past.  US confidence in the capability of the United Nations on matters of peace and security declined.  The US, on many occasions, exercised its veto power to prevent actions and resolutions from being undertaken and adopted by the Security Council.  During this period, nothing changed on the international stage except the actors.  The United Nations system for the maintenance of peace and security remained ineffective.  The assumption behind giving powers in the field of peace and security to the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution did not realized.  It was clear that the provisions of the Resolution could not be used to coerce a major power or to initiate collective measures in situations where a permanent member of the Council would feel its vital interests be threatened.  The Resolution was meant to achieve quicker consideration by the Assembly, but not the exercise by this organ of powers to which a permanent member objects.[21]

     With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the picture of the world changed. All the consequences of the Cold War ended.  The United States is again the center of influence within the United Nations.




II. Available Methods for Achieving Changes in

 the United Nations



     Many changes have taken place within the United Nations system since the drafting of the Charter of the Organization in 1945.  The Charter in 2007, as it has been profoundly influenced during the past six decades by customs and usages, interpretation, resolutions of various United Nations organs, supplementary or supporting treaties, and the changing conditions in the international stage, is hardly the Charter that was drafted in 1945.

     The text of the Charter, except of articles 23, 27, 61 and 109, is the same today as it was on June 26, 1945, the day when the delegates of the 50 nations assembled at San Francisco solemnly affixed their signatures to it.  The Charter, however, in its practical application is not the same as it was then.  Some of its gaps have been filled.  Some articles, which in 1945 seemed to be very essential for effecting the expectations of the founders have become dead letters.  Others, which then seemed to be of minor importance, have unexpectedly come to be significant.  The relative importance of organs, functions and procedures have changed in more than one instance.

     The founders of the United Nations meant it to be a living organism that would grow with the changing world.  This expectation of growth and change is expressed, near the end of the Charter, in a short chapter entitled "Amendments".[22]  Changes in the United Nations system, however, have come about in a variety of ways other than by amending the Charter.

     The following examines the methods by which changes can be made in the United Nations. First, the methods employed since 1945 are surveyed.  Then, the provisions of the Charter relating to formal amending process are examined.



A. Informal Methods Used to Date

     Because the formal amending procedures of the United Nations Charter are too rigid to allow necessary changes, and because the political circumstances are not conducive to their use, other means have been found to achieve desired ends.  The Charter has been subjected to changes in a variety of ways and to greater effect than is generally believed.  It has been changed: (1) by the failure to implement or apply certain provisions; (2) through the interpretation by various organs and members of the United Nations; (3) through the conclusion of supplementary or supporting treaties or agreements; and (4) through the creation of special organs and agencies.



(1) Failure to Implement or Apply Certain Provisions

     Several articles, which those who participated in the San Francisco Conference believed were highly important in making the United Nations an effective instrument for maintaining world peace, have been already fallen into disuse.  This has been because organs and members of the organization have disregarded or have failed to implement or apply them.  Perhaps the best examples are those articles relating to the military preparation of the United Nations.  Article 43, which was meant to be the heart of the collective security system provided for in the Charter and the teeth which were put into collective security action under the United Nations, has been disregarded.  Under it members of the United Nations are required to make available to the Security Council, in accordance with special agreements, the armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for maintaining international peace and security. Unfortunately, these agreements have never come into existence; and article 43 remains a dead letter.

     Equally dead are Articles 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48, which are related to the use of armed forces by the Security Council and which are largely dependent on the entry into force of Article 43.  Article 44 gives a say to individual member states in all decisions of the Council concerning the employment of that member's armed forces. Article 45 provides for immediately available air forces for combined international enforcement action.  Articles 46 and 47 entrust the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee with the task of planning for the application of armed forces and employing and commanding such forces.  And Article 48 requires all members of the United Nations to carry out the Council's actions concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.  Taken together, all these Articles with Article 43 are the cores of the collective security system of the United Nations, as it was envisaged at the San Francisco Conference by the drafters of the Charter.

     The same fate had fated Articles 106 of the Charter. Under the heading “Transitional Security Arrangement”, there is Article 106 that was meant to cover the short transitional period anticipated before the making of the “special agreements”, which would give the United Nations the forces necessary for its collective actions. Article 106 provides that prior to the time the Council is ready to begin exercising its responsibilities concerning collective enforcement actions, the five permanent members of the Council should consult with each other with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as might be necessary to maintain international peace and security.  In short words, this Article gives the super powers the joint responsibility for maintaining peace and security on a transitional basis.  The super powers, however, because of the division among them, have failed to give effect to this transitional arrangement.



(2) Liberal Interpretations

     The Charter of the United Nations, as any constitutional instrument, grows and takes on new meanings as the Organization accepts challenges and meets demands and needs.  The only provision in the Charter relating to its interpretation is the one implied in Article 96. Under this Article the General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion “on any legal question”; such opinions, however, have no binding legal effect.  This flexibility in the Charter has led to a number of significant developments in the United Nations.

     In practice and in line with the general understanding reached at the San Francisco Conference, the organs and member states of the United Nations have felt free to interpret the various articles of the Charter as they have been fit.[23]  Consequently, any interpretation of any provision of the Charter which a majority of the members may believe to be reasonable one can prevail in any particular instance.  This explains why the Charter has its liberal, as well as its strict, constructionists.  The liberal interpretation, however, has been in ascendance much of the time.  It has been very helpful in strengthening the General Assembly, giving more of a policy-making role to the Secretary General and its staff, and overcoming the deadlock in admitting new members to the United Nations.[24]

     The most significant development, which was due to a liberal interpretation of the Charter, relates to the all-important question of voting in the Security Council.  Article 27, Paragraph 3, provides specifically that for other than procedural matters, decisions of the Council are to be made “by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members”.  In its early history, the Security Council took the position that an abstention or an absence of a permanent member did not constitute a negative vote. This liberal interpretation of Article 27, Paragraph 3, has been the prevailing one since then.  It was this interpretation, together with the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council, that made it possible for the Council to take action with respect to the North Korean attack against South Korea in 1950.  The difference between this liberal interpretation of Article 27, Paragraph 3 and the strict one is substantial.  Under the strict interpretation, when a permanent member abstains or is absent at the time of the vote is taken no decisions can be reached by the Council. This is a clear illustration of how differently the Charter may be interpreted, and how an interpretation may make a difference.  Another illustration of how differently the Charter may be interpreted is found in Paragraph 2 of Article 27, which provides that decisions of the Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.  This article does not spell out the distinctions between the procedural and substantial matters.

     At the San Francisco Conference, the five major powers agreed on the strict interpretation of “procedural’ questions. They agreed that procedural questions, for the most part, were those involved with the organizational matters referred to in Articles 28 to 32 of the Charter: the adoption of the rules of procedure of the Council; the selection of the president of the Council; the time and place of the Council's meetings; the establishment of subsidiary organs; the adoption of conditions for the participation of a state that is not a member of the United Nations in the Council's discussion; etc.  Beyond this point, these powers agreed in their Statement of June 7, 1945, that decisions of the Council which might have “major political consequences” should be made by the unanimous vote of the permanent members.[25] This narrow interpretation has not followed by the General Assembly, which has been attempting to narrow the area within which the veto should apply.  The Assembly has been inclined to define procedural questions very broadly.  In its resolution of April 14, 1949, the Assembly recommended to the Council that some thirty-one decisions should be considered procedural, and that the Council should conduct its business accordingly.[26] Included in the list were a number of decisions that previously had been considered substantive, such as those relating to the pacific settlement of disputes and the admission of new members to the United Nations.  Obviously, there is a substantial difference between the strict interpretation agreed on by the major powers at the San Francisco Conference and the liberal one urged on the Council by the Assembly.   Either of these two methods of interpretation could be applied; however, this is dependent on the members of the United Nations.

     Another significant development, which was due to the liberal interpretation of the Charter, relates to the expanding nature of the political activities of the Secretary General. The articles of Chapter XV relating to the role of the Secretary General leave the impression that his political functions are to be quite limited in scope.  In practice, however, both the Security Council and the General Assembly have taken a broad view of his function.  He has exercised an influential role in various fields.  He has made statements before the Council and the Assembly on a variety of questions.  He has undisputed authority to place any item he considers necessary on the provisional agenda of both organs.  He has played an effective and influential role with respect to peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping operations; a role which those who participated in the San Francisco Conference did not foresee.

     Still another demonstration of what interpretation can do is reflected in the sharp shift in the roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly.  In the Charter of the United Nations, much emphasis is placed on the primary responsibility of the Council in the field of international peace and security.  The Council is designed to be the most powerful and influential organ of the United Nations.  It is organized to be able to function continuously, designed to have armed forces at its disposal, and empowered to make decisions binding on all members of the international organization.  The General Assembly, on the other hand, is designed for much less important roles.  It is scheduled to convene in regular annual sessions.  It was not designed to have armed forces at its disposal.  It is only empowered to make recommendations, not decisions binding on ­members of the United Nations.  Its main weapons are discussion and debate.  In practice, however, the Assembly has undergone evolutionary growth.

     As the Security Council has fallen into disuse, because of the division among its permanent members, the Assembly has become a stronger and more important organ.  The Assembly has gradually played a much different role than was foreseen by those drafted the United Nations Charter.  Various devices, ways and means have been employed to expand the Assembly's activities and influence in about every field.  The creation of the Interim Committee in 1947 (and its recreation in 1949) was meant to keep the Assembly in virtually continuous session if necessary.[27] The adoption of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution in 1950 aimed to empower the Assembly to take action against an aggressor if the Council fails to exercise its responsibility for maintaining international peace and Security.[28] Moreover, this resolution aimed to make available at the disposal of the Assembly armed forces.  It asks member states of the United Nations to maintain within their national forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be available for service as United Nations units.

     Today, the General Assembly can convene in an emergency session within 24 hours.  It can make appropriate recommendations to members of the United Nations for collective measures, including the use of armed forces. All this was made possible only by the liberal interpretations of the Charter's provisions relating to the functions and powers of the General Assembly.



3. Conclusion of Supplementary or Supporting Agreements

      The Charter has been subjected to changes as a result of numerous treaties and agreements that have been concluded by various states.  Treaties and agreements have been used as devices to define in detail the general provisions of the Charter, to specify the rights and obligations of member states, to specify the powers and functions of the United Nations organs, and to lay down obligations and commitments that go beyond those contained in the Charter.  The most important example of such developments is the establishment of regional and security arrangements or organizations.  Article 52, Paragraph 1 of the Charter provides that nothing in it shall preclude “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies” for dealing with “matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security,” provided that they are “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Paragraph 2 of this Article requires members to seek pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or agencies.  Paragraph 3 requires the Council to encourage such behavior. Under Article 53, the Council is required, where appropriate, to utilize such regional arrange­ments or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

     Despite its provision for regional arrangements, the Charter of the United Nations was primarily designed to approach matters of collective security on a world-wide basis. Consequently, the primary responsibility for international peace and security was vested in the Security Council.  However, because of the failure of the Council in assuming its responsibility, members of the United Nations, in search of an alternative, concluded numerous treaties and agreements establishing regional arrangements or organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact (ceased to exist in 1990), the Inter-America Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Organization of African Unity (became the African Union), the Arab League, etc.  By these treaties and arrangements, the member states shifted the emphasis from universal collective security to regional security arrangements based on the principle of self-defense as expressed in article 51. Regional security arrangements constitute different techniques for joint action than the one that exists under the Charter of the United Nations.

     Another important supplementary device to the Charter is the declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ.[29] Although the Charter obliges members of the United Nations to settle their disputes by peaceful means referred to in Article 33 of the Charter, it does not impose any particular means on the disputants. By acceding to the so-called optional clause of Article 36 of the ICJ Statute, the states agree in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to legal disputes in which they may become involved.  The declarations enlarge the competence of the ICJ by imposing on the states obligations over and above those already embodies in the Charter.

     Still there are numerous resolutions and declarations adopted by various organs of the United Nations, and covenants and conventions concluded by states under the auspices of the United Nations, covering about every field which are meant to supplement or support the Charter. These supplementary devices dealt, for example, with: status; rights and obligations of states and other international legal persons; authority over land, sea and space; trade and development cooperation; human rights; peaceful settlement of international disputes; the use of force; etc.  Each of these devices has played a role in the development of provisions of the Charter.



4. Creation of Subsidiary Organs

     Articles 22 and 29 of the United Nations Charter respectively authorize the General Assembly and the Security Council to establish such subsidiary organs as are deemed necessary for the performance of their respective functions. During the sixty years of the United Nations’ history hundreds of committees, commissions, panels, special representa­tives, boards and agencies have been established. These subsidiary organs have been assigned a wide variety of functions covering all areas of the Assembly's or the Council's responsibilities.

     The General Assembly has established many organs to assist it in carrying out its responsibilities in the administrative and financial field. Some have permanent status such as the Interim Committee, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Committee on Contributions, and the Board of Auditors. Some important subsidiary organs created by the Assembly, e.g., the Collective Measures Committee and the International Law Commission, have been assigned to undertake studies of a general character. Many operating agencies, e.g., the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the High Commission for Human Rights, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (OCHA), and the Development Programme (UNDP), have been established to administer a variety of relief, rehabilitation, and assistance programs in the field.

     In the field of peace and security, the General Assembly has created many organs entrusted with a wide variety of functions.  Some of a permanent nature, e.g., the Peace Observation Commission, and the Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation, have been created to serve where they might be needed.  Many ad hoc organs have been created, from time to time, to deal with particular situations. Many have been entrusted with investigatory functions. Others have been assigned to observe particular situations. A number of subsidiary organs have been assigned with functions of mediation, conciliation and good offices. In addition, there have been military forces created by the Assembly as its subsidiary organs for peace-keeping purposes.

     To assist it in performing its responsibilities, the Security Council has established its own subsidiary organs.  It has created standing commissions or committees of a permanent nature, e.g., the Committee on the Admission of New Members, to assist it in particular aspects of its work or to deal with certain recurring matters. It has established organs to deal with particular questions or situations for the task of investigation, observation, mediation, and assisting in the implementation of its resolutions or peace-keeping operations.

     The importance of the subsidiary organs created by the Assembly and the Council rests in the fact that without the assistance provided by them main organs of the United Nations could not effectively discharge their responsibilities under the Charter.  The establishment of such organs does not amend the Charter in any substantive way, but it does constitute an important feature of the developing United Nations system under the Charter.




 B. Formal Methods Available Under the Charter

     Two different methods of amending the Charter of the United Nations were agreed upon at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. The first is the ordinary procedure of amendment set forth in Article 108.  The second is the comprehensive review by a general conference provided in Article 109.



1. Ordinary Amending Process

     Article 108 of the Charter outlines a two-step process that is to be followed for the ordinary amending process of the United Nations Charter: (a) an adoption of the proposal by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly; and (b) a ratification by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. In connection with these two steps, three points should be noted.  First, a proposed amendment may be adopted by the Assembly without any concurring action by the Council.  The will of the majority of two-thirds of the members prevails.  No single state, whether small or super, can prevent an amendment from being adopted.  Second, Article 108 reiterates the principle of permanent members' unanimity.  It requires that amendments must be ratified by all the five permanent members of the Council.  This means that no amendment can become effective if it is opposed by any permanent member.  Any one of the permanent members can prevent the entry into force of any amendment even if it is ratified by all other members of the United Nations.  Third, after being ratified by the two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the five permanent members on the Council, an amendment would become effective with respect to all members, even those that voted against it in the Assembly or failed to ratify it.  The dissatisfied member has only one remedy, that is, to withdraw from the Organization.

     Until 1963, none of the profound changes in the United Nations system which took place were brought about through the formal amendment process of the Charter. Formal amendments, however, were proposed on various occasion.  During the first few sessions of the Assembly, a few proposals were made to amend the Charter. One of these was a proposal introduced in 1946, to amend Article 27, Paragraph 3, in order to curtail the use of the veto, but it was withdrawn for lack of support.[30]  In 1956, following the great influx of new members, further proposals to amend the Charter were brought up in the Assembly.  The most significant were the proposals: to amend Article 61 in order to enlarge the Economic and Social Council; and to amend Article 23 in order to increase the number of the nonpermanent members on the Security Council, and correspondingly to amend Article 27 in order to increase the number of affirmative votes needed for a decision by the Council to be adopted.[31]  The Cold War atmosphere prevented amend­ments to the Charter from getting the support of all the five permanent members; of course, no amendment could come into effect without ratification by all of them.

     The pressure to pass amendments to the Charter continued over the years until 1963 when an agreement was reached for this end.  At its eighteenth session, the Assembly adopted amendments to raise the number of the members of the Economic and Social Council to 27, and to expand the size of the Security Council to 15, with a corresponding amendment to Article 27 to require 9 affirmative votes for the adoption of the Security Council's decisions.[32]  These amendments entered into force on August 1965 when the members of the United Nations, including the 5 permanent members on the Council, ratified them in accordance with their constitutional processes.

     When Articles 23 and 27 were amended, the requirement of seven votes for calling a conference to review the Charter in Article 109, Paragraph 1, was not changed.  The Assembly in 1965 adopted an amendment of this Paragraph to conform to the new requirement of Article 27.



2. General Conference for the Charter's Review

     Article 109 outlines a three-step process to be followed in case of review of the Charter by a general conference of the members of the United Nations: (a) a call for holding a conference by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and a concurring vote of nine members of the Security Council; (b) an adoption of the alteration to the Charter by a two-thirds vote of the conference; and (c) a ratification of such alteration by two thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all five permanent members of the Security Council, in accordance with their constitutional process.  In connection with these steps, four points should be noted.  First, the review of the Charter as a whole is not the business of the General Assembly, but of a “General Conference” of all members of the United Nations.  It is a kind of constituent assembly which may be called to continue the work of the San Francisco Conference.[33]  Second, a reviewing conference could be called for at any time.  Third, none of the permanent members of the Council, or all of them together, by their negative vote can prevent the calling of a general conference.  Fourth, each of the permanent members, however, can prevent the entry into force of any alteration to the Charter by failing to ratify it.

     It seems that, as far as amendments of the Charter are concerned, there is no difference between Articles 108 and 109.  Any amendment must be approved by a two-thirds vote of either the General Assembly or the General Conference.  Moreover, even if “alterations” (under Article 109) or “amendments” (under Article 108) to the Charter are approved, they would come into force only if ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all five of the permanent members of the Security Council.

     Paragraph 3 of Article 109 outlines an additional specific one-time procedure for reviewing the Charter.  It provides that if a conference has not been held before the tenth session of the Assembly, “the proposal to call for such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session” and “the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.”  This provision is no longer applicable since the tenth session of the Assembly has passed and the only decision possible under it has been taken.[34]

     The decision to include a specific provision for a general conference to review the Charter was a product of a compromise between the position of the major powers and that of those who were dissatisfied with certain provisions of the Charter, especially, those of Articles 27 and 108.  Its objective was to assure the dissatisfied states that there would be an opportunity for reviewing the Charter at some future time.

     During the first three sessions of the General Assembly, proposals for the calling of a general conference to review the Charter were introduced.[35]  None, however, was adopted because of the opposition of many members who argued that the time had not yet come to convene such a conference, and that because of the division among the major powers it was unwise to discuss amendments of the Charter.

     Because no conference to review the Charter was held prior to the tenth session of the General Assembly, the proposal to call such a conference was automatically placed on the agenda of the tenth session as required by Paragraph 3 of Article 109.  The debate at that session revealed little enthusiasm and much reluctance by many members of the United Nations for calling such a conference.[36]  The General Assembly adopted a resolution expressing the view that it would be “desirable to review the Charter in the light of experience gained in its operations”, but that such a review “should be conducted under auspicious international circum­stances.”[37] In this resolution, the Assembly did not fix the time or the place for the conference.  However, a committee was established to consider the matters in consultation with the Secretary General.  To this resolution, the Security Council gave its concurrence.[38]

     At its tenth session, the General Assembly did not call for holding a conference to review the Charter as required by Paragraph 3 of Article 109. This could be understandable since this Paragraph did not guarantee that a conference would be held.  The Assembly was under no obligation to call a conference, but merely to place the matter on the agenda of its tenth session.[39] 

     Both Articles 108 and 109 provide far too rigid procedure for amendment of the United Nations’ Charter.  The process is just as long and just as difficult under any of these two Articles.  This explains why during the sixty-year history of the United Nations no substantial changes in the Organization have taken place through the formal amending processes provided in the Charter.  Profound changes in the United Nations system have been accomplished only through informal methods.





[1] Statement by former US Secretary of State Cordell Hull on the Occasion of the Signing of the Charter, June 26, 1945, 13 Dept. of State Bulletin, 13, Washington DC (1945).
[2] See UN Charter arts. 23, 27, 61 & 109.
[3] 2 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Building Peace, 693 (1973).
[4] More than 80 nations whose peoples were under colonial rule have joined the United Nations as sovereign independent states since the UN was founded in 1945.
[5] For a detailed discussion, see R. Emerson, The United Nations and Colonialism, in The Evolving United Nations: A Prospect for Peace, 83-99, K. Twitchett (ed.), London (1971).
[6]See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). For a discussion of this resolution and the uses made of it, see Kay, The Politics of Decolonialization: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process, 21 Int'1 Org., 786 (Autumn 1967); and Emerson, pp.  2,  90-92.

[7] See L.M. Goodrich, The United Nations in a Changing World, 48, Oxford (1974).
[8] See T.M. Frank, Nations Against Nations, 247, Oxford (1985).
[9] Id. p. 247.
[10] See M. Moskowitz, The Roots and Reaches of  the United Actions and Decisions, 18, The Netherlands (1980).
[11] See id. p. 26.
[12] See Goodrich, The United Nations in a Changing World, pp. 112-113.
[13] Id.  p. 113.
[14] Article 43 stipulates:
 1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location; and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement and agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the security Council. and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes
[15] See  Goodrich, The United Nations in a Changing World, pp. 114-115.
[16] G.A. Res. 377 (V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
[17] It should be noted that this right granted to the Assembly was not intended to be substitute for the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but rather a supplement. This is why the preamble to the resolution reaffirms “the importance of the exercise the Security Council of its primary responsibility” and “the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto”.  Also, this is why the resolution in Section A of the Resolution requires the Assembly to exercise its primary responsibility and only in cases where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.
[18] See L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, Charter of the United Nations, 124-25, 3rd & rev. edn., New York (1969).
[19] See 1 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, p. 266.
[20] “Détente” is a French word, literally means a relaxation of tension. It has been used as a short-hand for a complex process of adjustment between the East and the West since the early seventies. The policy of detente encompassed a continuing dialogue between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in the. areas of arms control, trade, scientific and technical exchange and crisis management. The essence of the policy was the coexistence relationship between the two powers. See generally, U.S. Dep't of State, The Meaning of Détente, Washington D.C (1974).

[21] Goodrich, The United Nations in a Changing World, p. 117.
[22] UN Charter chapter XVIII (arts. 108 & 109).
[23] See F. Wilcox & C. Marcy, Proposals for Changes in the United Nations, 12, Westport (1955)
[24] See 1 Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 266 (1973).
[25] Doc. 852, III/1/37(1), 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 711 (1945).
[26] See G.A. Res. 267 (III), U.N. Doc. A/900, at 7 (1949).
[27] See G.A. Res. 111 (II), U.N. Doe. A/519, at 15 (1947); and G.A. Res. 295 (IV), U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 17 (1949).      .
[28] See G.A. Res. 377 (V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).

[29] Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ stipulates: “The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize on compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all disputes…”
[30] See 1 U.N.  GAOR 2nd  Pt. C. 1,  Annex  7a,  at 323-24, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/34 (1946)
[31] See 11 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Items 56, 57 & 58) at 1-5 & U.N. Docs. A/3138, A/3140, A/3446,  A/3468/Rev. l  & A/L.217/Rev.l  (1956).
[32] See G.A. Res. 1991 (XVIII), 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
[33] See A. Martin and J.B. Edwards, The Changing Charter, p.12 (1955).
[34] See G.A. Res. 992 (X), 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (NO. 19) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955).
[35] See 1 U.N. GAOR C.1 2nd Pt. Annex 7b at 324 & 326, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/49/Rev. l (1946); and 3 U.N. GAOR Ad. Hoc. Pol. C. Annex  (Agenda Item 17) at 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/A.C.24/31 (1948).
[36] For the debate, see 10 U.N. GAOR (542nd – 547th plen. mtgs.) at 296-370, U.N. Docs A/P.V.542-547 (1955).
[37] G.A. Res. 992 (X0, at 49.
[38] See 10 U.N. SCOR (707th mtg.) at 30-31, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.707 (1955).
[39] See Goodrich, Hambro & Simon, pp. 644-456.